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 In Japan, the Covid-19 pandemic has led to an accelerating diff usion of all-hazard, di-
saster-resilient policy integration. Japan’s initiatives centre on maximizing the co-benefi ts 
from the deployment of scarce fi scal, material, human and other resource. This paper shows 
that Japanese experts have not only built a resource-effi  cient Covid-19 response, but are also 
using the crisis to ramp up Japanese-style collaboration on resource-effi  cient and sustainable 
communities, both in Japan and overseas. The paper also details why this resource-effi  ciency 
is essential in the critical raw materials sector. Japan’s initiatives could be an important indi-
cator of how to stay on track, at a time when action on the climate challenge risks being de-
railed. Japan’s measures further integrate the UN 2030 Agenda’s three pillars of the Paris 
Agreement, Sustainable Development Goals （SDGs），and the Sendai Framework of Disaster 
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Risk Reduction （SFDRR）．The paper also details why this resource-effi  ciency is essential in 
the critical raw materials sector. As we see, the challenges are of such enormity that seabed 
mining may be required to mitigate myriad risks.
Countering Covid-19
 In the fi rst half of 2020, Japan waged an apparently successful campaign against Covid
-19 . In the May 7  Financial Times former head of the UN Framework Convention on 
Climate Change, Christiana Figueres, included Japan among the few countries that “acted in 
line with the risks.” A number of previous vocal critics of Japan’s response have conceded its 
success in preventing an outbreak “on the scale seen in many Western countries” （Normille, 
2020）．One key to Japan’s achievements on Covid-19 is an “expert-led approach” （Du, 
2020）: experts implemented countermeasures that maximized the effective use of con-
strained resources in the midst of a complex institutional environment and still-confusing 
scientifi c data on what is best practice. Those lessons apply to Japan’s smart-city decarbon-
ization and other goals as well.
 We see evidence of Japan’s success in fi gure 1 , which compares Covid-19 mortality 
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across several countries as of May 3 , 2020. The data indicate that Japan’s levels of mortality 
were quite low as measured by available comparative statistics. Among the countries dis-
played in the fi gure, only Hong Kong recorded a lower level of mortality as measured by 
deaths per million persons.
 Figure 2  provides one measure of the relative constraints on Japan’s ability cope with 
Covid-19. The means for pandemic response is a large category, encompassing masks, venti-
lators, medical staff , and other material and human resources. The fi gure shows that Japan 
had comparatively abundant health-sector workers, as one would expect in the world’s most 
aged society. So at fi rst glance, Japan would seem well-endowed with the resources to com-
bat a pandemic such as Covid-19.
 But in fact, Japan’s health workers are signifi cantly under-trained in contract-tracing 
and other aspects of pandemic response. Moreover, the health workers also had inadequate 
supplies of masks, gloves and other “personal protective equipment” （PPE） required for the 
safe care of suspected and confi rmed cases of Covid-19.
 Figure 3  further highlights the resource constraint by comparing the rate of Covid-
19 testing across several countries including Japan. Japan’s current protocol for Covid-19 and 
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Figure 2 　 Resources for Combating Covid-19
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fected patients and then testing along with tracing other potentially infected individuals. The 
approach is very diff erent from widespread testing and is arguably “extremely cost-eff ec-
tive” （Crump, 2020）．Rather than devote massive resources to widespread testing and en-
forced lockdowns, Japanese experts centred their efforts and advice on a “ 3C” approach. 
The 3Cs encouraged individuals to avoid: 1 ） closed spaces with poor ventilation, 2 ） 
crowded places with groups of people, and 3 ） close-contact settings like one-on-one con-
versations （Feder, 2020）．
Providing Integrated Public Goods
 While fi ghting Covid-19, Japanese policymakers invest in a wide range of smart proj-
ects to reduce the cost of crucial public goods, including diversifying access to critical raw 
materials （e.g., cobalt, lithium, rare earths and copper） essential to sustainability （World 
Bank Group, 2020），further decarbonizing the energy economy, and bolstering multilateral 
collaboration. Indeed, while most other countries were debating whether to aim at a “green 
recovery,” Japan was already investing heavily in the governance and technology of decar-
bonizing and disaster-resilient transformation.
Source: Crump, 2020
Figure 3 　 Comparative Covid-19 Testing
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 The evidence of Japan’s proactive approach included its largely misunderstood fi scal 
stimulus. Table 1  shows that as of May 31, Japan’s Covid-19 fi scal countermeasures exceed-
ed 234 JPY trillion （about USD 2.0 trillion），roughly 42% of GDP. This total is the combined 
result of two major stimulus packages, both just over JPY 117 trillion, in March and then in 
May of 2020. In March of 2020, when Japan’s fi rst headline-grabbing JPY 117 trillion Covid-
19 stimulus was announced, much expert commentary pointed to the fact that it was not 
new fi nance. Analysts complained that the JPY 117 trillion stimulus （passed in April） built 
on Japan’s JPY 26 trillion December 2019 fi scal stimulus, displayed in table 2 . Their point 
was that the math of the April stimulus was exaggerated and misleading （Takemoto and 
Nakagawa, 2020），though the Japanese government did not hide the continuity from 
December.
 Lamentably, such criticism directed at the math of the April Covid-19 stimulus de-
fl ected attention from the December 2019 package’s content and its role in framing ongoing 
eff orts. To be sure, the December 2019 stimulus had nothing to do with Covid-19 per se. 
Rather, it focused on decarbonizing, all-hazard resilience in the wake of unprecedented 
fl oods, blackouts, and the other shocks Japan endured during 2018 and 2019. This emphasis 
on content is very important, as in March and April, World Bank and other experts were 
urging countries to include sustainability goals in their fi scal stimulus packages （Hammer 
Table 1 　 COVID-19 Fiscal Stimulus, % GDP （as of May 31, 2020） 
Country Fiscal Stimulus （Amount） Fiscal Stimulus （% GDP）
Japan JPY 234.2 trillion （USD 2 trillion） 42.2
US USD 2.9 trillion 14
Germany EUR 913 billion 26.9
France EUR 425 billion 19
China RMB 3.6 trillion  3.5
Source: Japan Cabinet Secretariat, 2020; IMF, 2020
Table 2 　 December 2019 Fiscal Stimulus （JPY trillion）
Measure Public Spending Total Public/Private
NRP and Disaster Reconstruction  5.8  7
Economic Risk  3.1  7.3
Post 2020 Olympic Games  4.3 11.7
Total 13.2 26
Source: Japan Cabinet Secretariat, 2020
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and Hallegate, 2020）．By then, Japan was already battling Covid-19 and climate change at 
the same time thanks to building on the December 2019 stimulus.
 Table 2  shows that there were three key pillars in the December 2019 stimulus: 
National Resilience Plans （NRP） and disaster reconstruction; economic risk countermeasures; 
and “Post 2020 Olympic Games” legacy investment in Society 5.0 , SDGs-inclusive society. 
The NRP projects emphasize that “coping with climate change is also conducive to disaster 
prevention.” Hence, investments in more robust communications, water, transport and other 
critical infrastructure is complemented with Net Zero Energy Buildings. In tandem, the 
Society 5.0/SDG initiatives explicitly target zero-emissions technology （such as natural re-
frigerants），energy effi  ciency, and related decarbonization （Japan Cabinet Secretariat, 2019）．
Of course, the 2020 Olympic Games have since been postponed to 2021, and in the end may 
not even be held. But that hardly means the investment in critical infrastructures is wasted, 
since they increase Tokyo’s holistic resilience and its capacity to accelerate its “Zero 
Emissions Tokyo Strategy” ambitions to decarbonize （DeWit, Djalante and Shaw, 2020）．
 We have seen that this initial December 2019 fi scal stimulus was more than quadru-
pled in the fi rst Covid-19 stimulus （of April 20），which brought additional spending on the 
National Resilience, SDGs and Society 5.0 detailed above. The expanded package also includ-
ed JPY 15 trillion for restructuring supply chains to re-shore or at least further diversify 
（e.g., among ASEAN countries） the production of a host of critical raw materials. Moreover, 
consistent with the December 2019 approach, the April package ramps up digital transfor-
mation, decarbonization, and other measures specifi cally to reduce the risks of future pan-
demics. It also emphasizes smart, SDG-style multilateral engagement on overseas water sys-
tems, public health and other critical infrastructure via Japan’s aid agencies plus the IMF, 
the World Bank, the Asian Development Bank, and other multilateral institutions with whom 
Japan has a record of close collaboration. Indeed, Japan is the largest contributor to the IMF, 
and its April stimulus included an additional USD100 million “contribution to the IMF’s 
Catastrophe Containment and Relief Trust as immediately available resources to support the 
Fund’s capacity to provide grant-based debt service relief for the poorest and most vulnera-
ble countries to combat COVID-19” （Georgieva, 2020）．
 And then on May 27, the Japanese government announced that it planned to double 
the stimulus yet again, to the over JPY 234 trillion total shown in table 1 . It remains too 
early to track how that additional fi scal boost, to an unprecedented 42% of GDP, will be used 
to further enhance all-hazard resilience. The early evidence looks encouraging, but the ques-
tion deserves a detailed examination at a later date.
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The Collaborative Industrial Policy Context
 Japan’s smart mitigation and adaptation measures are expanding within a larger holis-
tic paradigm of collaborative industrial policy （DeWit, 2019）．Japan’s “Society 5.0” industrial 
policy regime predated Covid-19 , and indeed was heavily funded in Japan’s pre-pandemic, 
December 2019 stimulus. Society 5.0’s policy arms include such critical cyber-physical link-
ages as digitalization in smart cities, “post 5G” next-generation communications, remote-sens-
ing for disaster risk reduction, 3 -D mapping for compact cities, monitoring and controls for 
integrating variable renewable energy, and other means to bolster evidence-based collabora-
tive governance. Japan’s Society 5.0 is also directly linked to the 2030 Agenda’s Sustainable 
Development Goals （SDGs）．Indeed, Japan’s approach to SDGs initiatives appears to be 
unique among the developed countries: its multi-level SDGs collaboration deliberately uses 
the SDGs’ 17 goals and 169 targets to focus local government projects on myriad domestic 
challenges in combination with overseas engagement and contributions. In short, Japan does 
not see SDGs as external aid but rather as a platform for integrating sustainable domestic 
and overseas development （Seki, 2019）．
 As is shown in Table 3 , Japan has organized a broadly inclusive Local SDGs Public-
Table 3 　 Japan’s Local SDGs Public-Private Collaborative Platform （as of April, 2020）
Member Class Number
Subnational Governments   453
Central Agencies 　 13
Private Firms and others   769
Total Membership as of end March, 2020 1,235
Source: SDGs Journal, 2020
Table 4 　 Japan’s Local SDGs Communities and Model Cases （as of April, 2020）
Category and Year Number
2018 SDG Future Cities 29
2018 SDG Model Cases 10
2019 SDG Future Cities 31
2019 SDG Model Cases 10
Total Cities and Cases Cities: 60, Model Cases: 20
Source: SDGs Journal, 2020
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Private Collaborative Platform. The platform includes 453 local governments in addition to 
most of the national government’s central agencies. It also includes 769 business fi rms, re-
search institutions, NPOs and other members, bringing the total to 1,235 members as of 
April 2020.
 Table 4  shows the ongoing results of the Japanese Cabinet Offi  ce’s eff orts to dissemi-
nate best practice. Since 2018, the Cabinet Offi  ce has opened a competition for subnational 
governments to be designated as SDG Future Cities and for particularly well-integrated ini-
tiatives to be designated as Model Cases. As of April of 2020, there are 60 SDG Future Cities 
and 20 Model Cases, indicative of the prioritization of the program and its widespread im-
pact.
 A further important platform context for shaping Japanese action is its Smart City 
Public-Private Collaborative Platform, whose membership is itemized in table 5 . Of particu-
lar note is the growing number of local governments, at present 114. The platform is yet an-
other venue via which the 2030 Agenda integration of decarbonizing and inclusive Paris 
Agreement, SDGs, and SFDRR best practices are shared among multiple stakeholders.
 A more recent platform is Japan’s Green Infrastructure Public-Private Collaborative 
Platform. Table 6  shows that its membership as of March 2020 exceeds 400 local govern-
ments, central agencies and other stakeholders. The local government membership includes 
Sendai City （the host city for the Disaster Risk Reduction program），Tokyo, and other infl u-
ential cases. Moreover, the important role of central agencies is coupled with the participa-
tion of business, academe, NPOs and other stakeholders whose collective expertise encom-
passes water, energy, construction, and other areas crucial to designing and implementing 
comprehensive green-infrastructure solutions. This emphasis on green-infrastructure not on-
ly helps achieve the 2030 Agenda goals of mitigation, adaptation and inclusive sustainability; 
it also reduces the burden of future costs for maintain traditional “grey infrastructure” such 
Table 5 　 Japan’s Smart City Public-Private Collaborative Platform （as of March, 19, 2020）
Member Class Number
Subnational Governments 114
Central Agencies  11
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as levees （Nakamura, et al, 2019）．
 One of Japan’s key governance platforms for designing, implementing and revising in-
tegrated policy is National Resilience （DeWit, Djalante and Shaw, 2020）．National Resilience 
predates the 2030 Agenda’s SFDRR, formally adopted in 2015, and closely parallels the lat-
ter’s content by emphasizing all-hazard disaster preparation, building back better, and “whole 
of government” inclusive collaboration. National Resilience also encompasses smart communi-
cations, sustainable energy systems, resilient water networks, and the other critical infra-
structures that are essential to holistic resilience in the modern city. It should be no surprise 
that Japan is doing this, as it confronts innumerable natural hazards plus severe demograph-
ic, fi scal and other challenges. Japan has also historically been the leader on international dis-
aster resilience frameworks, which is why the first international framework is the 
Yokohama Strategy （1994） and the second the Hyogo Framework （2005-2015）．The 2015-
2030 Sendai Framework of Disaster Risk Reduction （SFDRR） continues this tradition of 
Japanese leadership, which emphasizes community involvement and integration with other 
objectives （de la Poterie and Baudoin, 2015）．
 National Resilience is also Japan’s program for closely linking national and subnational 
governments in a rapidly expanding portfolio of national and subnational NRPs that have le-
gal precedence over other plans. NRPs are aimed at bolstering the country’s resilience to 
natural disasters and other hazards, before they happen, as well as fostering the capacity to 
recover from such disasters when they occur. Since 2014 , there have been 2  iterations 
（2014, 2019） of the NRP Basic Plan as well as 6  annual action plans that decide and then 
monitor the planning cycle and the achievement of Key Performance Indicators （KPI）．
These KPIs include hard measures, such as monitoring hazards via smart sensors, strength-
ening back-up power for hospitals and other facilities, reinforcing fl ood-control systems, and 
hardening critical communications infrastructure. The KPIs also include soft measures, such 
Table 6 　 Japan’s Green Infrastructure Public-Private Collaborative Platform 
（as of March, 19, 2020）　　　　　　　　　　　　　　　
Member Class Number
Subnational Governments  23
Central Agencies 　4





as skill-building, risk communication, and measures to break down governance silos. In the 
2019 revision of the original 5 -year NRP Basic Plan, the number of KPIs had increased to 
179. The 2020 update of the NRP action plan is slated to raise the number of KPIs to 268. 
Moreover, Japanese National Resilience has been funded at roughly JPY 5  trillion per year 
since FY 2018. The investments fi nance soft and hard measures in addition to training and 
international engagement.
 A key test of any such ostensibly collaborative initiative is how well it diff uses and 
how purposefully engaged the actors are. By April 1  of 2020, all of Japan’s 47 prefectures 
had adopted their own regional versions of the NRP. Moreover, as table 7  shows, 1,445 of 
Japan’s 1,741 cities, special wards, and towns had either adopted their own local versions of 
the NRP or were formulating plans. This number of local governments doing NRPs was 
more than seven times the 190 total from a year earlier, April 1  of 2019 . That startling 
760% rate of increase in one year is testament to the rapid spread of comprehensive risk-
awareness in Japan. Recent years of unprecedentedly destructive typhoons, fl oods and other 
disasters have led to a consensus on the need for comprehensive planning and integrated 
counter-measures. Japan’s subnational governments now routinely request increased regular 
budget and special fi scal stimulus spending on NRP, SDGs, Society 5.0 projects and their inte-
gration in the smart city. These fiscal and related requests are articulated collectively 
through such subnational representative organizations as the National Governors’ Association, 
The National Mayors’ Association and others.
 One example of how the December, 2019 fi scal stimulus is being used at the subna-
tional level is seen in table 8  on Sapporo City. The table shows that Sapporo’s 2020 initial 
Table 7 　 Increase in Japan’s Local National Resilience Plans （NRPs）
Administrative Level April 1, 2019 April 1, 2020
Local Government 190 1,445
Source: National Resilience （2020）




Resilient Schools  9.36
Emergency Power  0.24
Flood and Other 11.32
Future-Oriented 
Investment: 11.1
ICT in Schools  9.54
Source: Sapporo, 2020
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spending on economic stimulus, responding to the national government’s December stimulus 
package, focused on close to JPY 19 billion for resilient and smart schools. Resilience schools 
emphasize enhanced seismic countermeasures in addition to safe water and power supply. 
Other spending included JPY 11.32 billion on bolstering the city’s waterways, transport net-
works and other critical infrastructure. This emphasis on resilience is no surprise. Like many 
of Japan’s subnational governments, Sapporo is aggressive in building on national policy to 
pursue integrated solutions to disaster, demographic, fiscal, and myriad other hazards. 
Sapporo was thus selected as one of the SDGs projects in June of 2018, and followed that up 
in December 2019 by revising the NRP it had adopted in January of 2016. Sapporo had al-
ready been undertaking a Compact City Plan from March of 2016, and had also implemented 
a Smart City initiative from March of 2017 . The Sapporo case is illustrative of the perme-
ation of holistic resilience planning to the local community. This local initiative is stimulated 
not only by central government fi nancial incentives on a scale found in few other nations but 
also by silobreaking, comprehensive planning and industrial policy.
Resource-Constraints
 Japan’s emphasis on the cross-sectoral integration of policies, stakeholders and infra-
structures, to maximize resource-effi  ciency, is important not only for the reasons discussed 
above, but also because of costs and material constraints in other realms. For example, as 
noted earlier, there is an emergent consensus that the recovery from Covid-19 must be con-
sistent with the goals of the 2030 Agenda. For many observers, this means emphasizing 
power generation via solar and wind projects （variable renewable energy, or “VRE”） as the 
centerpiece of a “green recovery.” Those VRE investments certainly can help decarbonize 
power, but they are only part of a larger portfolio of strategic investments for resilient and 
equitable decarbonization （IEA, 2020a）．VRE are also not necessarily the least expensive 
and most materially effi  cient means for accelerated decarbonization. These points appear to 
be particularly relevant in the Japanese case. As shown in fi gure 4 , Japan’s costs for VRE 
are considerably higher than for coal and natural gas, a sharp contrast to the other countries 
except for South Korea. Moreover, among the countries represented in the fi gure, including 
South Korea, Japan’s solar and onshore wind costs are the highest.
 Figure 4  is also not comprehensive. For one thing, it only compares the cost of new 
build for power generation facilities themselves while overlooking larger system costs. The 
latter include power transmission and distribution infrastructure in addition to other ancil-
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lary costs such as power storage. These costs vary depending on the location of a given VRE 
or other power-generation project, the proximity of power transmission lines, and other fac-
tors. In short, it is misleading to insist that the cost of VRE solar panels and wind turbines 
are falling, and thus declaring them to be the cheapest option, without paying attention to 
whether the transmission, storage and other system costs are declining as well （Cox and Xu, 
2019; Lesser, 2019; World Economic Forum, 2019）．
 Moreover, power generation is only one area where decarbonization is possible, as 
there are many sectors that release CO2  and other greenhouse gas （GHG） emissions. Figure 
5  illustrates some of the details. It shows that total anthropogenic CO2  emissions in 2017 
were roughly 37 gigatonnes （Gt）．Roughly 13.6 Gt was from power, while road transport 
represented a further 6.0 Gt. These two areas are generally the focus of green visions, with 
their emphasis on VRE and electric cars. But total anthroprogenic CO2  emissions were ‒ as 
noted ‒ 37 Gt., leaving a further 17 Gt from several other sectors. Industrial CO2  emissions 
　 Source: Fickling, 2020
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were one large sector, at 6.2 Gt, and land use was 6.0 GT. 
 There are myriad proposals for decarbonizing sectors other than power. One is the 
use of hydrogen as an energy vehicle in order to displace natural gas and other fuels used 
for industrial heat （such as in making steel and cement）．Figure 6  outlines the abatement 
costs of this approach, in USD per ton of CO2  and assuming that the cost of hydrogen is 
USD 1 /kg in 2050. At the time of writing, hydrogen costs roughly USD 3 /ton, and is large-
ly produced by reforming natural gas （IEA, 2019a）．So the assumed reductions in genera-
tion costs and infrastructures are quite significant. Moreover, Bloomberg New Energy 
Finance estimates that to meet about 24% of current global energy needs with hydrogen 
generated through electricity would require 31,320 terawatt-hours （TWh） of power. That 
fi gure is enormous, and in fact exceeds the global total of 25,700 TWh of gross electricity 
generation from all sources （ie, renewable, nuclear, and fossil fuels） in 2017 （IEA, 2019b）．
Expressed in percentage terms, fossil fuels were 66.8% of gross global power generation in 
2017, hydropower 16%, nuclear 10%, wind 4 %, solar 2 %, biofuels and waste 2 %, and geo-
thermal, tidal and others a mere 1 % （IEA, 2019b）．Indeed, even by 2019, total power gen-
erated by large low-carbon hydro, nuclear, biomass, and VRE was only about 10,000 TWh, of 
which VRE provided less than 2,100 TWh （IEA, 2020b）．Thus any proposal to emphasize 
  Source: Fickling, 2020
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Source: IEA, Global Carbon Project
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VRE as the main source of hydrogen has to make a credible case for where the VRE plant 
can be sited, its cost-eff ectiveness versus other options （such as the use of nuclear），its 
comparative material-effi  ciency （ie, per-unit density of critical raw materials），and other 
factors.
 Figure 7  is reproduced from a study of German options on generating hydrogen and 
methane for use across a range of applications. The bottom section of the fi gure thus outlines 
the potential use of synthetic gases in power generation, heating, transport and industry. The 
analysis shows that it is technically possible to undertake such a transformation. But at the 
same time, the study concedes that “Germany may simply not have space for the number of 
wind turbines and solar panels needed to produce enough synthetic gas to meet demand, 
particularly given that German citizens are already resisting the construction of renewable 
energy infrastructure” （Wettengel, 2018）．The analysis suggests means of overcoming these 
constraints, including building off shore wind dedicated to producing hydrogen along with im-
porting synthetic gas produced in North Africa or the Middle East. 
 The above fi gures highlight some recent arguments pertaining to the scope for rapid 
deployment and use of renewables. In the midst of Covid-19, and the emphasis on a “green 
recovery,” many media and academic articles assume the world is well on the way to green 
energy （almost wholly conceived of as VRE）．One example is seen in a June 3 , 2020 article 
in the UK Guardian, which asserted that “Renewables surpass coal in US energy generation 
for fi rst time in 130 years” （Milman, 2020）．In addition, a June 11, 2020 article in Bloomberg 
News sought to convey the impression that these trends are global. The articles was titled 
  Source: Fickling, 2020
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“Renewable Power Will Soon Come Out on Top,” and emphasized net global capacity addi-
tions of the various types of power generation between 2010-19 （Bullard, 2020）．On this ba-
sis, it asserted that VRE solar and wind were set to dominate power systems globally.
 The Guardian and Bloomberg articles are just two of many examples wherein mass 
Source: Wettengel, 2018
Figure 7 　 Renewable Energy and Power-to-Gas Pathways
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media convey the impression that decarbonization of power and other sectors can largely be 
done by VRE. To be sure, the Guardian article is correct in noting that during 2019 coal con-
sumption in the United States fell to its lowest level in 42 years and that renewable energy 
is likely to exceed coal-fi red generation in 2020 . But the devil is in the details: the article 
downplays the fact that cheap natural gas has largely been substituted for coal. Moreover, 
the article emphasizes VRE among the renewable sources, without analyzing the massive 
role of hydro. Nor does the article explain that US energy consumption per se is a much 
larger phenomenon than just electricity, as is evident in fi gure 8 . 
 Figure 8  illustrates the scale of the challenge. It is produced by one of America’s 
leading institutions, Lawrence Livermore National Laboratory （LLNL）．LLNL has generated 
charts on US commodity flows since the mid-1970s, and is regarded as a highly credible 
source of data. Its estimate of 2019 energy consumption shows, for one thing, that energy is 
not only electricity. Of about 100 quadrillion British Thermal Units （Quads） of estimated en-
ergy consumption in the US during 2019, 37% was used to generate electricity. Of the 100 
Quads of total energy consumption for all purposes, VRE solar and wind accounted for only 
3.78% of all energy. This level was well under half the 8.46% from nuclear and roughly a 
third of the 11.4% from coal （which is used for heat and other industrial processes）．And 
these numbers pale when compared to oil and natural gas, both of which are well over 30% 
of US energy consumption. Hence, one has to keep dramatic increases in any given energy 
source in perspective. New additions to the low base of VRE lead to misleadingly high num-
bers for percentage increases, especially in capacity as opposed to actual power output. 
These numbers can often make continued rapid growth seem inevitable.
 This is not to suggest that the renewable energy revolution is a sham. There has 
clearly been a prodigious deployment of VRE solar, wind, and other comparatively clean 
（when assessed over the life-cycle） power generation. These deployments have helped re-
duce GHG emissions and they have led to a dramatic cheapening of unit costs. The real ques-
tion is whether renewables ‒ and especially VRE solar and wind - are in fact on the way to 
becoming the majority of power generation in addition to the keystone for all energy supply. 
A related question is whether VRE is the most cost-eff ective investment for reducing GHG 
emissions. Rapid decarbonization is critical to slowing the pace of climate change （not to 
mention local pollution impacts from fossil fuels）．Hence, it is imperative that all aspects be 
considered in order to maximize the eff ective use of scarce fi scal, human, material and other 
resources, including time. If VRE confront a range of challenges, it is prudent to be honest 
about them and consider what ought to be done. After all, the goal is equitable and sustain-
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   Source: LLNL, 2019











































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































able decarbonization rather than merely building as much VRE and other renewables as pos-
sible, not matter the impacts.
 Land requirements, material density, and a host of other issues give cause to question 
whether an exponential increase in VRE renewable deployment is likely to continue. Both 
the Guardian and the Bloomberg articles ignore the fact that in many regions the easy sites 
for VRE have largely been exploited. As land located near transmission grids gets used up, it 
becomes increasingly time-consuming and expensive to plan, site and build generation. Such 
VRE as onshore wind has also become increasingly diffi  cult to build, even in European coun-
tries, due to local opposition （Taraldsen, 2020）．In addition, new build that is distant from 
transmission infrastructure and other assets requires signifi cant investment in transmission 
and ancillary equipment. All of those system costs require massive amounts of copper, co-
balt, lithium, graphite rare earths, and other critical raw materials.
 The next sections examine these issues in detail. The purpose here is to explore some 
of the emergent issues in greening the power economy. The World Bank, The IEA, IRENA 
and other institutions have recently become quite concerned about materials and related 
matters, even as they argue for accelerated deployment of decarbonizing solutions. The re-
view of their work will be used to underpin the argument that Japanese-style resource-effi  -
ciency crucial for fi nding sustainable avenues of decarbonization.
The Critical Raw Material Challenge
 As noted, recent International Energy Agency （IEA, 2020a） reports on these critical 
materials warn that ambitious policies on renewables and electric mobility imply cobalt, lithi-
um, nickel and other critical material demand that exceeds current supply. The IEA’s con-
cerns parallel those of the Japanese1 ), the European Union2 ), the California Business 
Roundtable3 ), and a steadily growing number of other actors. Many of these critical materi-
als are used at far greater density, per unit of energy consumption or production, in green 
1 ）Japan’s JOGMEC and other agencies produce a range of materials, as do the carmakers （eg, 
Toyota）， battery suppliers （eg, Panasonic）， metal fi rms （eg Mitsubishi Materials） and other con-
cerns.
2 ）See, for example, EURACTIV’s November 2018 work on “Metals in the circular economy”: 
https://www.euractiv.com/section/circular-economy/special_report/metals-in-the-circular-economy/
3 ）See “A Closer Look at California’s Cobalt Economy,” California Business Roundtable, January 
2019 : https://centerforjobs.org/wp-content/uploads/A-Closer-Look-At-Californias-Cobalt-Economy-2.
pdf
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technologies as compared to conventional power systems, automobiles, and the like. And sup-
plies of these materials have other competing sources of demand, including smart phones, jet 
engines, health care, and multiple other areas. The IEA and other analyses discuss supply 
constraints, geostrategic risks, human rights concerns, environmental damage （from harvest-
ing and processing critical materials），and other issues.
 The World Bank has also been concerned about the supply-demand balance of critical 
raw materials for several years. Based on its earlier work in this area, on May 11, 2020 it re-
leased “Minerals for Climate Action: The Mineral Intensity of the Clean Energy Transition” 
（World Bank Group, 2020）．The report sought to examine scenarios of likely demand for co-
balt, copper and other materials, their potential GHG impact, and risks for shortages. One im-
portant backdrop to the report was the multiple eff ects of the Covid-19 pandemic, which 
produced a drop in prices for materials and investment in new supply due to lockdowns. The 
World Bank sought to assess the likely capacity to satisfy the need for materials in light of 
this context and the arguments for a green recovery.
 Figure 9  is taken from the report, and refl ects some of its main analytical assump-
tions. The fi gure shows that the report used 6  diff erent IEA and IRENA projections for the 
power sector to 2050. These projections vary depending on whether the premise was busi-
ness as usual, increased policy supports for renewables, or very aggressive “most ambitious” 
proposals for decarbonization via renewables. The report refers to these as “technology-
based mitigation strategies.” These strategies are not equally comprehensive, as some con-
cern only electricity generation whereas some examine power and storage as well. 
Collectively, their limitations are evident in the fact that they omit the material-density of 
power transmission and distribution networks not to mention other energy infrastructure 
（such as gas grids）．They also omit water, transport and other critical infrastructure, which 
have their own material requirements and are likely to be part of expanding built environ-
ments into which clean energy is mixed. Additionally, the scenarios overlook consumption by 
such products as air-conditioners, automobiles, televisions, data centres, and other devices. 
 The exclusion of these aspects of the built environment is not unavoidable for want of 
data. For example, the International Resources Panel collects comprehensive data on the ur-
ban material footprint, including in its 2018 report on “The Weight of Cities: Resource 
Requirements of Future Urbanization” （IRP, 2018）．Presumably there is some means of 
standardizing household consumption and then estimating average material-density under 
decarbonizing assumptions.
 For example, the diff usion of air conditioning is already being modeled. Air condition-
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ing is especially crucial to human health in the midst of rising heat and humidity and increas-
ingly frequent heat waves. The current global average is use of air conditioning is 720 hours/
yr. Due to climate diff erences, RAC usage hours per year in China average 545, in Japan 720, 
but 1,600 in the US. Usage equals or exceeds 1,600 hours/yr in India, Mexico, Brazil, 
Indonesia and the Middle East （the latter is an astounding 4,672）．Because of global climate 
change, these usage hours are increasing at an estimated 0.7%/yr （leading to a 25% increase 
by 2050）．
 The Rocky Mountain Institute （RMI） and other partners, including many elements of 
the Indian Government （eg, the Ministry of Power），have organized an initiative to cope 
with the unsustainable power demand posed by conventional air conditioning in a warming 
climate. The RMI analysts and their collaborators point out that the global number of room 
air conditioners （RACs） in 2016 was roughly 1.2 billion （over 400 million in China alone），
and that this fi gure is likely to increase to 4.5 billion by 2050. 
Source: World Bank Group, 2020
Figure 9 　 Energy Scenarios for 2050
Source: IEA 2016, 2017; IRENA 2019a.
Note: 2DS = 2－degree scenario, 4DS = 4－degree scenario, B2DS = beyond 2－degree scenario, 
CCS = cabon capture and storage, CSP = concentrated solar power, ETP = Energy Technology Perspectives, 
IRENA = International Renewable Energy Agency, PV = photovoltaic, Ref = reference scenario, 
REmap = renewable energy roadmap scenario.
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 The RMI draw on IEA and other data indicating that supplying the power demand 
for this growth in RAC stock, much of which will be concentrated in growing global mega-
cities, will require roughly USD 1.2 trillion in new generation capacity. This is because the 
2016 global RAC power demand of 2,300 TWh will likely more than triple over the same pe-
riod, reaching 7,700 TWh in 2050 （about 16% of global electricity demand）．That 5,400 TWh 
increase in power demand between 2016 and 2050 would require an astounding addition of 
2,000 GW of generation capacity, equivalent to “the current annual electricity consumption of 
the US, Japan, and Germany combined.” And the cumulative GHG emissions （from power de-
mand as well as the eff ect of refrigerant gases），projected at between 132 GT and 167 GT, 
would likely exhaust 25-50% of the remaining carbon budget.
 In India alone, where RAC penetration is only 7 % but sales are already increasing at 
15%/yr, the RMI and IEA estimates indicate a more than 20-fold increase in power demand 
for RAC, from 94 TWh in 2016, to 1,890 TWh in 2050. Seen in per-capita terms, urbanization 
in India is projected to raise RAC demand from a current global low of 72 kWh to 1,140 
kWh. Satisfying that level of demand would require India to install fully one-third of the 
global 2,000 GW of needed new generation capacity. The RMI is a staunch advocate of re-
newable energy and effi  ciency. Hence it is not deliberately bearish in warning that “[w] e can-
not solve this magnitude of growth by adding renewables alone.” It points out that the in 
2017 the total global increase of 94 GW in solar generation capacity was less than that year’s 
RAC incremental demand growth of 100 GW （Campbell, et al., 2018）．
 It would be useful to update these numbers with some calculations of copper and oth-
er material demand scenarios per unit of RACs and other cooling devices. That would add 
additional empirical realism to the World Bank’s data, not to mention the IEA and IRENA 
scenarios on which it is based.
 The World Bank Group’s 6  strategies are portrayed from left to right in fi gure 9 . 
The fi rst on the left, 4 DS, is a “base scenario,” wherein the global community maintains its 
current trajectory, with minimal improvements in shifting energy system away from fossil 
fuel sources. The next is RTS, which is slightly more ambitious. It assumes that “all countries 
will implement their Nationally Determined Contributions （NDCs），as proscribed under the 
Paris Agreement, resulting in an average temperature increase of 2.7°C by 2100.” The 2 DS 
scenario is more ambitious yet, and describes a “50% chance of limiting average future tem-
perature increases to 1.75°C by 2100.” The IRENA Ref scenario is similar to the RTS scenar-
io, and “accounts for actions, commitments made under current/planned policies, including 
NDCs. Rise in temperatures would be at least 2.6°C by 2100.” The most aggressive scenario 
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is IRENA Remap, drawn from IRENA’s RE roadmap of 2019. This last scenario seeks to lim-
it “the rise in global temperature to “well below” 2 °C above preindustrial levels by 2100” 
（World Bank Group, 2020）．
 Though the World Bank’s analysis is restricted to power, it does detail the essentials 
of most of the conceivable options for power-generation. This inclusiveness is seen in fi gure 
10 , wherein the “technologies outside the model” （oil-fi red power, biomass generation, ma-
rine power, and a few other minor sources） are shown as a share of those within the model. 
Barring as yet unforeseen development in power-generation technologies, it would appear 
that most of the relevant technologies are modeled.
 As noted earlier, storage is the only other aspect covered by the models, outside of 
generation per se. Also, the focus is on battery storage, as opposed to pumped-hydro storage 
（the majority of current power storage） and storage via power to gas. The IEA Technology 
Roadmap also notes that pumped hydro storage is both fl exible and helps balance variable 
wind and solar. At 172 GWs, PHS provided 95% of global power storage capacity in 2017 
（IEA 2018b）．Figure 11 of the World Bank report shows that the vast majority of their 
modeled storage in power is automotive battery storage.
 Table 9  lists up the 17 critical raw materials and other minerals considered in the 
study. Most countries compile their own lists of critical raw materials, basing them on supply 
Source: World Bank Group, 2020
Figure 10　 Technologies in the Model
Source: IEA 2016, 2017; IRENA 2019a.
Note: 2DS = 2－degree scenario, 4DS = 4－degree scenario, B2DS = beyond 2－degree scenario, IEA = International 
Energy Agency, IRENA = International Renewable Energy Agency, ETP = Energy Technology Perspectives, 
GW = gigawatt, Ref = reference scenario, REmap = renewable energy roadmap scenario.
IEA ETP 2016 IEA ETP 2017 IRENA－REmap
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risk, geopolitical risk, economic importance and other factors. The list of critical raw materi-
als has expanded in recent years, with the EU’s triennial assessment raising the number 



































Table 9 　 Critical Materials in the World Bank Study
  　　　　　　　　　 Source: World Bank Group, 2020
     Source: World Bank Group, 2020
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Source: Based on IEA ETP 2017.
Note: 2DS = 2－degree scenario, B2DS = beyond 2－degree scenario, GWh = gigawatt－hours, 














Bank study, the list is not exhaustive, as it does not include most rare earths, but it does cov-
er some of the main materials used in transition power generation to decarbonizing （or at 
least low-carbon） options. 
 Table 10 lists up the same materials displayed in table 9 , while also displaying their 
comparative relevance across sectors （ie, generation technologies, storage, and carbon-cap-
ture）．Copper is shown to be relevant across all the sectors, with nickel next in ranking, fol-
lowed by chromium and molybdenum. The data do not compare the material density per 

















































































Total 10 8 2 8 6 11 11 9 8 6
Table 10　 The Cross-Sectoral Role of Materials 
　　　　　　　　　　　 Source: World Bank Group, 2020
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sectoral role is one important measure of possible critical-material challenges.
 Table 11 off ers a generalized assessment of the various technologies’ useful lifetimes 
before replacement. Note that some of the data are questionable. For example, large hydro 
assets （dams） are generally much more robust and long-lived than the table’s 25-year life-
time would suggest. For example, “depending on the component, hydro lifetime ranges be-
tween 30 and 80 years with several plants operating for more than 100 years without major 
overhaul” （Kougias and Schleker, 2019）．Hydro turbine makers reportedly list 25 years as 
the design life of turbines, but only because they are required to. In fact, most exceed that 
fi gure by at least two decades （Renewables First, nd）．But in any event, the data do give 
an indication of material requirements, as replacement often entails new volumes of critical 
raw materials. A lot of cobalt, for example, cannot be recycled for use in batteries due to ex-
tremely exacting needs for purity （World Bank Group, 2020）．
 Figure 12 off ers one view of what metal demand looks like for solar through to 2050, 
depending on the comparative ambition of the scenario. The fi gure shows that the bulk of 
the demand ‒ in the million-ton scale （the y-axis） - is for aluminum, followed by copper and 
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Table 11　 Comparative Lifetimes of Technologies
　　　　　　　　　　 Source: World Bank Group, 2020
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　　　　 Source: World Bank Group, 2020
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are either not in the table （ie, silicon） or not required in those prodigious mega-ton volumes. 
It must be noted that material demand varies by over 400% depending on the scenario. 
 Figure 13 provides a clearer picture of the material demand for solar power through 
to 2050, using the IEA 2 DS scenario. It indicates that energy-intensive aluminum is 88% of 
material requirements, and copper 11.2%. The other metals include silver, lead, zinc, indium, 
molybdenum, and nickel.
 Figure 14 drills down further to examine the implications of solar technologies. The 
IEA 2 DS scenario can be achieved via a number of subtechnology options. The demand for 
indium varies according to the option. The least demand for indium arises from high crystal-
line silicon （“High crystal si”）．But this substitution presents its own issues, as the silicon 
must be very high-grade with minimal impurities. The source for this silicon is high-grade 
quartz, whose supply is constrained and whose processing is energy-intensive 
（Chandrasekharam and Pathegama, 2019）．The fi gure shows that there are alternatives to 
this, but that they involve higher reliance on the rare earth indium. Among the many issues 
that indium presents is the fact that its production is about 800 tonnes per year and general-
ly as a by-product of zinc mining. To increase the supply of indium entails a range of chal-
lenges, including opening new mines and increasing the rate of recycling. These challenges 
  Source: World Bank Group, 2020















are not necessarily insurmountable （Ylä-Mella and Pongrácz, 2016），but they do almost cer-
tainly imply price increases for the raw or recycled material. 
 Figure 15 aff ords another perspective on the shift in material demand. It shows that 
the IEA 2 DS scenario ‒ not especially ambitious, as noted earlier ‒ likely entails a quintu-
pling of aluminum demand. Aluminum is a very energy-intensive product, but its supply is 
    Source: World Bank Group, 2020








































Note: CIGS = copper indium gallium selenide, crystal si = crystalline silicon
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not constrained （Brough and Jouhara, 2020）．Aluminum is produced through the refi ning of 
alumina from bauxite, and the latter material’s reserves are currently assessed at 30.4 billion 
tonnes （Natural Resources Canada, 2019）．That abundance contrasts with lithium, cobalt, in-
dium and other materials, which in fi gure 15 are projected to require very high rates of in-
creased supply. And these results, it must be recalled, are based on quite conservative as-
sumptions coupled with leaving aside the larger system requirements to link power-
generation options to consumers.
 Table 12 presents the World Bank Group’s data from fi gure 15 in a format that shows 
the projected demand increase versus 2018 production volumes, and then the percentage of 
2018 production volumes （in tons） expected to meet demand. Despite the massive volumes 
of additional aluminum required, it is actually only 9 % of 2018 production. That contrasts 
with lithium, where annual demand in 2050 is projected to be a quintupling of current supply.
 Figure 16 shows that even with restricted assumptions and scoping, the annual demand 
for materials is set to ratchet up and continue. Of course, the demand varies considerably by 
scenario. But even the highest projected increase in demand is likely to considerably under-
state calculable reality.
 Table 13 presents the World Bank Group’s categorization of challenges in light of the 
above. The table separates the materials into 4  diff erent quadrants. It shows that quadrant 
Source: World Bank Group, 2020
Figure 15　 Increased Material Demand, Cumulative to 2050 vs 2018
a. 2050 annual demand from energy technologies
as percentage of 2018 production


































































































































































1  is only medium-impact in terms of demand due to the focus on demand from energy tech-
nologies only and the elimination of supply risks and other issues from the scope of the 
study. By comparison, the quadrant 4  material copper is a cross-cutting technology that the 
study believes will not be signifi cantly impacted. Yet this conclusion rests on the limited fo-
cus of the World Bank Group’s scoping plus the elimination of water and other challenges 
from consideration. It is understandable to try and keep a study manageable by constraining 
the number of variables to be considered. But it risks understating the problems, especially if 
they are dynamic and inter-related. For example, copper production depends on water avail-
ability. In turn, demand may be further increased by the declining availability of water, due 
to the need for more piping and other elements in water treatment and desalination （Wood 
Mackenzie, 2020）．












































































as percent of 2018
annual production
a. Data for 2018 annual production sourced from the U.S. Geological Survey.
b. Data sourced from Deetman et al. (2018).
Table 12　2018 Mineral Production and Projected 2050 Demand
Source: World Bank Group, 2020
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generation. The fi gure is from a May 2020 IEA report titled “Clean energy progress after 
the Covid-19 crisis will need reliable supplies of critical minerals” （IEA, 2020a）．The IEA 
fi gure ranks the material density of the various power generation technologies in kilogram 
per megawatt （kg/MW） of generating capacity. Its data show that the copper intensity of 
off shore wind is much higher than onshore wind, a very important fact given that local oppo-
sition to onshore wind is making the latter a preferred choice. The IEA’s fi gure also includes 
the role of silicon in solar, an item which was left out of the World Bank Group’s scoping 
study. 
 The IEA’s data also show that the material density of gas and coal-fi red generation is 
very low. But these fossil fuel generation technologies are also very high in GHG emissions. 
So the fi gure is only meant to illustrate that the transition to VRE decarbonization has high-
er critical material costs.
 An important aspect of the IEA study is that the material density’s measure is for 
rated capacity as opposed to actual power output. The signifi cance of this is due to the inter-
mittence of VRE, as depending on location and other pertinent factors a given capacity rat-
ing may actually generate only 10 to 50% of power. Among VRE, solar’s capacity factor has 
not changed considerably, at roughly 10-20% （IEA, 2018b）．In Japan, the power actually 
generated by intermittent VRE projects was only 12% （solar） or 20% （wind） of their total 
Source: World Bank Group, 2020
Figure 16　 Projected Annual Demand for Minerals to 2050
Note: “Minerals” refers to the 17 minerals included in this analysis plus steel, but excluding concrete. Steel has been 
included because of the size of demand for the alloy from energy technologies. Average annual demand is the mean 
demand for minerals across the time periods given. The higher mineral demand under the 2DS than the B2DS before 
2030 can be explained by the higher overall generation capacity projected by the IEA to be needed in the 2DS 
compared with the B2DS. This is especially true of solar photovoltaic in the 2DS in these time periods. Subsequently, 
the plateau in mineral demand in the 2DS is caused by a relatively slower penetration of renewable generation, 
followed by a rapid increase in storage capacity from 2035 onward. 2SD = 2－degree scenario, B2DS = beyond 2－

































capacity in 20154 ). The particularly signifi cance of the link between material density and ca-
pacity factors is that critical raw materials should perhaps be best used in the confi gurations 
that deliver the most decarbonizing eff ect. That argument would seem especially relevant if 
the supply and demand balance of critical raw materials is under stress via the pressure to 
accelerate the transition to decarbonizing energy.
 A similar phenomenon is seen in fi gure 18, which compares critical materials in con-
ventional and electric vehicles. The fi gure shows that electric cars have a much higher foot-
4）The US EIA undertakes comparative studies on average generation capacity factors （meaning the 
percentage of energy output versus rated capacity）．Its survey of output between 2008-2012 indi-
cates that Japan’s aggregate fi gure for both solar and wind is 15 percent, far less than the 27 per-


















Quadrant 1 minerals may appear to be less of a priority， but that may 
not necessarily be the case．Some of these minerals may be critical 
to key subtechnologies， and although some substitution may be 
possible， they may be strategically important to the clean energy 
transition． Since these minerals may not face the hign levels of 
demand faced by quadrant 2 minerals， nor the stable conditions faced
by quadrants 3 and 4， less priority may be given to these minerals， 
but in turn， this may result in potentially increasing their criticality， 
if supply constraints exist．
Demand for minerals in quadrant 2 is much higher， but it is much more 
concentrated in certain technologies or subtechnologies． Demand 
growth could be substantial， but potentially more varied if shifts in 
policy， market conditions， or other key factors cause different types 
of technology or subtechnoiogy to be deployed at greater， or lesser， 
levels．
Quadrant 3 minerals encounter the dual challenge of meeting high 
levels of demand from a broad range of technologies． They do not 
face the same challenges of technology choice as quadrant 2 minerals， 
but they face higher levels of relative demand than quadrant 4 minerals． 
Demand pressures are thus likely to be highest and most stable in 
these minerals．
Quadrant 4 represents stable and steady levels of demand． Minerals 
in this area are not so dependent on shifts in energy technology， and 
greater levels of climate ambition are likely to lead to increases in
these minerals across the board． Demand growth is therefore likely 
to be predictable and steady．
Table 13　 Implication of Energy Transition for Material Demand
Source: World Bank Group, 2020
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print （kg/vehicle） than conventional cars. The point is not, of course, that electric cars are 
bad for the environment. But it is important to recognize their material demands in addition 
to other devices. That recognition might help convince consumers to buy smaller cars 
（whose battery requirements are lower） or support alternatives such as public transport.
 Figure 19 is also drawn from the IEA study. It hints at the geopolitical implications of 
energy transition （along with other infrastructural aspects of decarbonization），by listing 
the top 3  producers of a given commodity. Natural gas and oil production are of course con-
centrated in the United States, Saudi Arabia, and Russia. But critical raw materials also tend 
to be concentrated among a few suppliers. The Democratic Republic of the Congo （DRC） is 
especially dominant in cobalt, a cause of much concern because of political instability, envi-
ronmental damage, child-labour, and other factors. As to rare earths, China is the supplier 
for 62.9%. China’s role has become a source of increasing concern in recent years, due to the 
accelerating importance of these materials and the fraught relationship between China and 
many other major consumers of these materials （such as Japan, the EU counties, and the 
United States）．
　　 Source: IEA, 2020a
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　　 Source: IEA, 2020a
Figure 18　 Comparative Assessment of Mineral Demand for Transport （units: kg/vehicle）
　　 Source: IEA, 2020a
Figure 19　 Geographical Concentration of Mineral Supply
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 The IEA’s report on critical materials is a warning on two fronts. One is that the ar-
gument for accelerated decarbonization as a counter-measure to the economic effects of 
Covid-19 entails material issues that need to be assessed. Rapid deployment of VRE has im-
plications, for example, for cobalt. The IEA points out, concerning cobalt, that “rapid growth 
has put strains on supply, as witnessed by the fi ve-fold increase in cobalt prices between 
2016 and early 2018. Although supply has responded, the volatility of prices in recent years 
has been a wake-up call for companies and governments in terms of the importance of reli-
able mineral supplies for clean energy transitions” （IEA, 2020a）．A second factor is that the 
pandemic has had signifi cant impacts on mining activity along with investment. The IEA’s 
warning in this regard is worth quoting at length:
 “The impacts of investment cuts vary by mineral. But some, especially copper and 
nickel, could soon feel strains when demand recovers. Demand and supply of copper and 
nickel were delicately balanced before the pandemic, and there were expectations that 
supply imbalances might emerge in the coming years.
 Short-term pressures have weakened with the contraction in demand caused by the 
Covid-19 crisis. But both minerals could see demand grow rapidly as the world emerges 
from the crisis and boosts eff orts to accelerate energy transitions, especially if many gov-
ernments put renewables and batteries at the heart of their economic stimulus packages” 
（IEA, 2020a）．
 The IEA’s concerns are well-grounded, as we see in fi gure 20. The fi gure displays the 
growth in cobalt production from 1970 to 2018 and the DRC share （in the fi gure, “Congo”）．
The increase in supply is particularly striking after 2008. The main driver for this is demand 
from batteries for electric vehicles, which represented 55% of global cobalt consumption in 
2019 （Faraday Insights, 2020）．This assessment seems credible, as the German Mineral 
Resources Agency expects batteries to account for 62% of cobalt demand of 225,000 tons in 
2026 （Siegel, 2019）．
 Figure 21 aff ords an additional perspective on the cobalt problem. It shows that the 
DRC share of production exceeds 60% in 2019. Even as other countries’ shares expand, the 
DRC’s production has remained the majority share for well over a decade （see fi gure 20）．
Analysts expect increased production from other areas and recycling to reduce the pressure 
on DRC supplies. But at the same time, we have already seen that it is diffi  cult to get invest-
ment into production.
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　　　　　　  Source: Faraday Insights, 2020
Figure 20　 Global Cobalt Production 1970-2018
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　 Source: Faraday Insights, 2020
Figure 21　 Global Cobalt Production by Country 2019
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 Moreover, fi gure 22 shows that the DRC share of total global reserves of 7  million 
tons is over half, at 3.6 million tons. Reserves are not the only factor, as potentially recover-
able resources are also important （dependingon price, technology, and other factors）．Total 
global terrestrial resources are thought to be 25 million tons （USGS, 2020）．But in the short 
term, it would appear that the DRC will remain the main locus of production. One reason is 
that cobalt mining is generally not for cobalt per se, but rather with it as a byproduct of min-
ing for nickel or other metals. Another reason is that opening up new mining capacity is gen-
erally quite costly and time-consuming. In developed countries, there is often a great deal of 
opposition to expanded mining （Martine, 2020）．
 Figure 23 aff ords a perspective on the global cobalt supply chain, from extraction, to 
processing, and then to manufacturing of alloys and the products they are used in. The left 
of the fi gure shows that most mines are not for cobalt per se, but rather industrial mines 
wherein cobalt is a by-product. Artisanal mines are largely in the DRC, where cobalt is 
mined deliberately and often at great costs to human rights. The far right of the figure 
　 Source: Faraday Insights, 2020
Figure 22　 Global Cobalt Reserves by Country, 2019



































































































shows that the majority of manufacturing tales place in East Asia, centring on batteries for 
automobiles and electronic devices. As noted earlier, it is especially diffi  cult to recycle cobalt 
for battery use, due to high purity requirements in that application.
 Recycling is generally seen as the key means of reducing critical raw material de-
mand. The is a large literature on the “circular economy” that seeks to recycle as much ma-
terial as possible. Some of this emphasis is well-grounded. As we see in fi gure 24, recycling 
aluminum can dramatically reduce the amount of new material required. One reason is that 
aluminum is infi nitely recyclable. Another is that recycled aluminum is about 90% less ener-
gy-intensive than virgin aluminum （Green, 2007）．It thus makes economic sense to recycle 
aluminum. The fi gure shows that 100% end of life （EOL） recycling of aluminum would allow 
61% of required supply to be satisfi ed by secondary （ie, recycled） material rather than pri-
mary, and energy-intensive material.
 Similarly, fi gure 25 suggests that greater recycling and repurposing of materials might 
not be enough to reduce the GHG cost of using VRE and other energy generation. In the 
World Bank’s assessment, the largest contributor to GHGs is producing aluminum, largely 
used in the VREs solar and wind. The next highest is graphite used in battery storage, and 
third the nickel used in storage and wind （primarily）．The data indicate that under the IEA 
Source: Faraday Insights, 2020
Figure 23　 Global Cobalt Supply Chain
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　 Source: World Bank Group, 2020
Figure 24　 Recycling Aluminum for Energy Savings
Note: EOL recycling rates are assumed to increase annually to meet 100 percent EOL by 2050. This means that 
secondary aluminum meets an increasing amount of aluminum demand over time. 
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   Source: World Bank Group, 2020
Figure 25　 Recycling Aluminum and Other Materials for GHG Reduction
Note: CCS = carbon capture and storage, MtCO2e = million tons of carbon dioxide equivalent.
Aluminum Graphite Nickel Cobalt Copper Lithium



















2 DS scenario, the production and operation of VRE and storage represent 6 % of coal and 
gas generation. That diff erence is, to be sure, large. But overall, the emissions up to 2050 rep-
resent 16 Gt of CO2  equivalent, which is equal to the combined emissions of China and the 
United States in 2018 . The World Bank concedes that these numbers do not take into ac-
count transporting the minerals. 
 And one might add that the data do not account for increased energy, water and oth-
er costs to extract materials from declining ore grades. For example, recent data for copper 
suggest that required energy inputs per unit of output have increased signifi cantly in recent 
years （Palacios, 2019）．One 2017 study of Chilean copper production warned that “electricity 
demand for Chile’s copper production is expected to increase by 53.5 % between 2015 and 
2026, although the planned increase in copper production over that period is only 7.5%” （AT 
Mineral Processing, 2017）．
 One of the key drivers of rising energy demand in mining is the declining quality of 
ore grades. Figure 26 puts these two realities in context by presenting the relationship be-
tween ore grade （eg, the percent of copper in an ore body being mined） and energy cost, 
with 2010 data for copper and a generalized calibration for 39 other metals. Energy is re-
quired at all stages of production, from extraction through to processing and then shipment. 
Source: Fizaine and Court, 2014
Figure 26　 Ore Grades and the Energy Cost of Extraction
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Increasing amounts of water used in these functions also contribute to rising energy demand. 
The fi gure indicates that as ore grades decline to the 0.5% level （mined material as a share 
of total material mass） the energy costs （gigajoules per tonne） increase dramatically and 
then skyrocket when they pass the 0.25% level.
 This serious problem in ramping up the extraction of copper and other metals has 
been understood and quantifi ed for many years by resource experts. One example is seen in 
the United Nations Environmental Programmes’s International Resource Panel （UNEP） 2014 
study “Decoupling 2 : Technologies, Opportunities and Policy Options.” The UNEP agreed 
with the standard argument that technological innovation can help locate new resources as 
well as make some additional amount economically recoverable. But it warned that “this 
very rarely avoids the need for more energy, water and resource inputs to extract the same 
quantity of a natural resource. The tendency to process lower grades of ore to meet increas-
ing demand is leading to a higher energy requirement per kilogram of metals, and conse-
Source: Smol, et al., 2020.
Figure 27　 EU Green Deal Elements
Transforming the
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quently to increased production costs” （UNEP, 2014）．
 These factors reviewed above all help to explain why the EU is stressing critical raw 
materials in its Green Deal. Figure 27 outlines the ambit of the EU Green Deal, showing that 
it encompasses energy, food, transport and a wide array of areas.
 Figure 28 outlines the strategy for getting to circularity. It shows that recycling and 
reuse are only part of a larger whole. Along with those come greater self-suffi  ciency in raw 
materials, seen in the upper right-hand of the fi gure. The EU has in fact undertaken a con-
centrated industrial policy to achieve more critical raw material self-suffi  ciency.
 Figure 29 shows why there is a great deal of concern in the EU, especially with re-
gard to cobalt and other materials discussed above. We can see from the table that the EU 
has managed to achieve considerable self-suffi  ciency with respect to materials like yttrium , 
vanadium and others. Recycling and other policies have helped achieve these high levels. 
However, there is virtually no self-suffi  ciency in the EU for indium, copper, cobalt and the 
other materials reviewed in the World Bank Group study. The vulnerability is clear, in light 
of the massive material requirements and the geopolitical uncertainties. One could add that 
the potential for dramatic cost increases in materials could severely impact “green recovery” 
plans.
 Figure 30 underscores the EU’s vulnerability. Even after end of life （EOL） recycling, 
the EU’s self-suffi  ciency for indium, copper, and cobalt remains virtually zero. The data sug-
gest that it is rather easier to design circular economy approaches, as plans, than it is to ac-
　　 Source: Smol, et al., 2020.
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tually implement them. The myriad challenges include not just cost and compliance （by busi-
ness and the public），but also the diffi  culty of extracting important critical raw materials 
from amalgams.
 Figure 31 illustrates a wide discrepancy among the EU countries concerning material 
consumption. This variation suggests that there is considerable room for reducing consump-
tion, particularly among the Nordic countries. Many arguments related to critical raw mate-
rials indeed assume that reduced consumption is key. But that solution cannot apply globally, 
as the vast majority of the human population has far lower levels of material consumption 
than EU countries, North America and East Asia （such as Japan, Singapore, South Korea, 
and coastal Chinese megacities）．Most scenarios on critical materials overlook this global 
context, which makes the modeling much easier but also renders the results quite suspect.
 Figure 32 is a 2019 publication from the EU Science Hub, one that seeks to generalize 
a sense of crisis concerning critical raw materials. We have seen that the EU seeks to pur-
sue a Green Deal, which implies a higher density of critical raw materials. Recycling and con-
　  Source: Smol, et al., 2020.

















































0 20 40 60 80 100 120 140
EU self－sufficiency for RMs [%]
Share of Secondary RMs in the Demand for Mineral Resources
立教経済学研究　第74巻　第 1 号　2020年44
servation can help reduce risks, but only partially. The Science Hub initiative aims to illus-
trate this. Figure 32 thus lists how raw materials play their roles in a wide variety of devices 
and applications in energy, defence, and other spheres.
 The EU Science Hub was concerned to measure increased demand for various critical 
materials, versus current global supply, based on the EU’s target of 32% renewable energy 
by 2030. The 2030 targets include reaching 88 GW of wind, 45.4 GW of solar, and 10 million 
electric vehicles. Hence, the EU experts, meeting in Brussels from the 14th to 22nd of 2019, 
launched in tandem an interactive feature. The interactive is displayed in fi gure 33. On the 
left-hand side, it itemizes 9  critical raw materials, complete with clickable access to each 
material’s import dependence （ie, the EU’s dependence），the country or countries of origin, 
Source: Smol, et al., 2020.
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　 Source: Smol, et al., 2020.
Figure 31　 Domestic Material Consumption per capita in the EU （28） in 2018
　   Source: EU Science Hub, 2019
Figure 32　 EU Supply Risks
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the current global supply, the range of uses （ie, cobalt is used in jet engines and other devic-
es），and the relative share used in “green technologies” （VRE and electric vehicles）．The 
interactive’s upper menu allows the user to select a given year and other aspects of the EU’s 
eff orts to achieve its 2030 green targets by VRE （wind and solar） and electric vehicles. The 
interactive then calculates possible materials shortages stemming from projected demand for 
“Green Technologies” （right-hand side of the fi gure）．
 As we see in fi gure 34, even if one calculates only the amounts needed for the EU to 
reach 32% RE by 2030, the planetary supply runs into shortages on some non-substitutable 
items in short order. The fi gure shows that a simple run of the interactive alerts the user to 
an impending shortage of dysprosium in 2021, should the EU Green Deal proceed according 
to plan in deployments of wind. The interactive reveals that total global supply of dysprosi-
um is 1,355 tonnes, one of the rarest of the rare earth metals, and crucial for magnets in a 
range of industries and applications. Fully 95% of the EU’s dysprosium is imported from 
China, and ‒ in global terms ‒ 72% of dysprosium is used by “non-green” industries, for mag-
nets, leaving only 28% of supply for wind and electric vehicles. Subsequent runs show that 
lithium and other materials also soon become insuffi  cient in subsequent years.
 These results probably under-estimate the crisis. For one thing, the EU aims at a 
　   Source: EU Science Hub, 2019
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32.5% increase in energy effi  ciency, which implies the use of a lot of digital equipment and 
other devices that consume critical raw materials. To include these elements in the interac-
tive might hasten the onset of shortages.
 In addition, the sobering results are just for the EU. The EU’s 513 million residents 
are only 6.7% of the global total of 7.7 billion people. That means generalizing the EU’s green 
energy ambitions would rapidly worsen the critical raw material challenge.
 Moreover, the EU has special advantages compared to much of the rest of the world. 
Most low- and middle-income countries will have to grow their energy consumption in order 
to provide clean water, education, and the other public goods central to SDGs and the other 
elements of the 2030 Agenda. But in the EU, overall energy consumption is fl attening and it 
has an international power grid to balance VRE with large hydro generation and pumped 
storage in Norway and Switzerland. There is also plenteous low-carbon nuclear power in 
Sweden and France, together with other baseload and low-carbon assets （biomass and bio-
gas） that help back up VRE. Other countries aiming to depend on VRE would have to over-
build and add in massive storage capacity, putting additional pressure of critical raw materi-
als.
 For example, consider that the average per-capita stock of copper in the developed 
　 Source: EU Science Hub, 2019
Figure 34　 EU Critical Raw Material Supply Risk for Dysprosium
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world is 140-300 kilograms （kg） as compared to 30-40 kg in less-developed, lower-income 
countries （UNEP, 2010）．These developed countries are generally the high-income coun-
tries, which account for 17% of the global population of 7.6 billion. The stock of copper in 
high-income developed countries is embodied in electricity grids, electric motors, plumbing, 
and a myriad other items in daily use. The high-income countries are being joined by many 
more billions in a wave of urbanization that could add about 2  billion new city dwellers over 
the next 15 to 20 years. The material implications of this urbanization are evident in the case 
of China. Recent estimates of per-capita copper stock in China indicate that it rose from 7  
kg in 1990 to 60 kg in 2015, an eight-fold increase （Soulier, 2018）．
 Most of the rest of the world lacks the EU’s capacity to balance various types of low-
carbon power. So achieving 100% renewable energy globally, especially as a green response 
to Covid-19, would require an astoundingly ineffi  cient （and critical material intensive） build-
out of wind and solar plus battery storage, rapid construction of EU-style international grids, 
and other emergency measures. 
 Thus a global acceleration of VRE deployment, to meet pledges of 100% renewable 
energy by 2030/2050 or whenever, would be a great many times more material-intensive 
than illustrated in the EU’s interactive tools. 
 Against this backdrop, it is rather dismaying that the World Bank left the environ-
ment and related implications of material demand to the last section of its report. It recog-
nizes that most additional extraction of materials will happen in developing countries, in 
large part because so many of the resources are there. But as we see in fi gure 35, its propos-
al for climate-smart mining entirely disregards the water and other stresses of increased 
mining. Since ore grades are declining, the amount of overburden to be dealt with is increas-
ing. That results in greater energy, water and other use, with corresponding impacts on the 
environment and human health － precisely the items that “climate-smart mining” is ostensi-
bly aimed at protecting.
 The World Bank Group report is worth quoting at length on these omissions:
 “Beyond specific climate-related risks, other environmental and social risks of in-
creased mineral extraction also need to be considered throughout the supply chain. These 
have not been addressed in this analysis given the focus on GHG emissions.
 From a broader environmental perspective, for example, the water intensiveness of 
the mining sector and the impact of deforestation need to be integrated in how these min-
erals will need to be produced to sustainably supply clean energy technologies.
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 From a social perspective, understanding issues such as the impact of mining upon lo-
cal communities is vital to ensure that the transition to a clean energy system is benefi cial 
for all. Given how critical minerals are to the low-carbon transition, a failure to address 
these wider environmental and social risks could facilitate a backlash against renewable 
electricity generation and energy storage technologies needed to mitigate GHG emissions” 
（World Bank Group, 2020）．
 It is precisely these concerns that led Michael Moore and Jeff  Gibbs to highlight envi-
ronmental consequences in their 2020 documentary, “Planet of the Humans.” The documenta-
ry is a warning about VRE and other renewable energies, insisting that they are not as envi-
ronmentally friendly as reputed. The documentary attracted a great deal of criticism from 
fervent supporters of a VRE-led green shift or Green New Deal. Whatever its errors, the 
fi lm certainly did correctly highlight the environmental and human rights implications of co-
balt, as illustrated in fi gure 36. The documentary showed that critical raw materials do not 
only have environmental damage, but also severe implications for human rights. Cobalt is es-
pecially problematic in this respect, because artisanal mining produces about 30% of the 
DRC’s supply which in turn is about 70% of global supply. Thousands of children are exploit-
ed in these artisanal mines （Sanderson, 2019）．Figure 36 is one visualization of that political-
Source: World Bank Group, 2020





































































































 The Moore/Gibbs fi lm could be faulted for not adequately pursuing the question of 
how to implement 2030 Agenda goals in developing countries when the bulk of the materials 
they supply are used ineffi  ciently in developed countries. We have seen that critical raw ma-
terial resources are constrained, and in many cases diffi  cult to recycle and repurpose. So it 
seems imperative to ask whether it is environmentally just that resource-effi  ciency not be 
fi rst and foremost in proposals for greening. Many green enthusiasts in developed countries 
celebrate the diff usion of small-scale VRE without bothering to ask whether the low capacity 
factors and requirement for additional storage, transmission and other infrastructure imposes 
costs on the regions where the critical raw materials are extracted.
 Yet it seems quite clear that the more rapidly the rollout of materially ineffi  cient de-
carbonization in the developed world, the greater the risk of leaving the developing world 
with worsened environmental damage. And that damage might be exacerbated by even 
more constrained choices on clean development. That is because the critical materials used 
ineffi  ciently in developed countries will almost certainly not be available in suffi  cient quanti-
ties and reasonable prices for low-income developing countries. There is, in short, the patent 
risk of a truly historic and possibly irremediable injustice. This prospect, plus the lack of at-
tention to it, is a bitter irony considering the developed world green activists’ emphasis on 
Source: https://planetofthehumans.com
Figure 36　 Cobalt in The Planet of the Humans
Michael Moore Presents: Planet of the Humans | Full Documentary | Directed by Jeff Gibbs
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environmental justice in their own cities and countries.
 These uncomfortable realities have evidently led many analysts to confi ne the scope 
of their studies, leaving the larger issues to be mentioned ‒ if at all ‒ near the end of their 
work. That failure to take on the larger implications has left an enormous analytical hole. But 
recent work on the critical material challenge has advanced the proposition that the environ-
mentally sustainable alternative is deep-sea mining. The fi rm DeepGreen Metals commis-
sioned a very thorough study on this issue. One result is displayed in table 14 . The study 
compared the impacts for mining nickel, manganese, cobalt and copper from terrestrial 
sources and the sea fl oor. The focus was on the material needs of 1  billion electric cars, and 
not the much larger needs of decarbonizing the built environment. All the same, the work is 
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Table 14　 Comparing Terrestrial and Sea Floor Mining
Source: Paulikas, et al., 2020
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instructive because it compares the sources of the materials. This work is without precedent, 
as these has been no previous estimation of the comparative impacts. As we see from the ta-
ble, the results suggest that mining sea-fl oor nodules rather than terrestrial sources has con-
siderably lower emissions, land use, water use, waste and even biodiversity impacts. 
 There is no scope in this paper to delve at greater depth into the question of whether 
terrestrial or marine mining is more sustainable. Suffi  ce it to say that because of mounting 
critical material demand, geopolitical risks, and other factors, many countries already seek to 
mine the sea floor. These countries include Germany, China, South Korea, Brazil, Russia, 
Japan, and others. Many are particularly interested in cobalt. As a recent article on the issue 
noted, “they have exploration contracts for cobalt-rich ferromanganese crusts. Cobalt is a vi-
tal component in batteries, including car batteries. It is a rare mineral and considered dan-
gerous to mine on land” （Abbany, 2020）．The marine resource base also greatly dwarfs the 
terrestrial resource base. We saw earlier that the USGS assessed terrestrial cobalt resources 
at 25 million tons. Its surveys indicate that more than “120 million tons of cobalt resources 
have been identifi ed in manganese nodules and crusts on the fl oor of the Atlantic, Indian, and 
Pacifi c Oceans” （USGS, 2020）．
Conclusion
 We have seen that many critical materials are used at far greater density, per unit of 
energy consumption or production, in green technologies as compared to conventional power 
systems, automobiles, and the like. And supplies of these materials have other competing 
sources of demand, including smart phones, jet engines, health care, and multiple other areas. 
The IEA and other analyses do not adequately discuss supply constraints, geostrategic risks, 
human rights concerns, environmental damage （from harvesting and processing critical ma-
terials），and other issues. These challenges are all central to sustainable development and 
the circular economy. The emerging facts suggest that any credible, rapid shift to sustain-
able energy and effi  ciency will require prioritizing the use of constrained critical materials. 
Doing that will almost certainly require Japanese-style comprehensive governance.
 The fi rst imperative is to reduce undue reliance on any particular material via substi-
tution. The Japanese did this in the wake of 2010, when rare earth price rose and Chinese 
policies on rare earths indicated increased risks of export bans against Japan. In response, 
the Japanese invested heavily in alternatives. These strategic investments resulted in such 
innovations as new magnet technologies that greatly reduce the role of neodymium. 
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 Yet substitution has its limits, because of the enormous projected increase in demand 
for nearly all these materials. One example is seen in the eff ort to use nickel to reduce reli-
ance on cobalt in electric vehicle batteries. In collaboration with Panasonic, the US automak-
er Tesla has been at the forefront of this initiative. Indeed, Tesla’s goal is to entirely elimi-
nate the role of cobalt in electric-vehicle （EV） batteries, and it is achieving notable success 
in this objective. However, the initiative has encountered something of a “whack a mole” phe-
nomenon. This is because supplies of nickel are increasingly constrained, posing a challenge 
to large-scale substitution of cobalt in the high energy-density batteries required for electri-
fi ed transport. Global demand for nickel in EV batteries is projected to increase from 3 % of 
all sources of demand （such as stainless steel, non-ferrous alloys, and other products） in 
2018 to 12% by 2023, as global automakers are expected to introduce over 200 new EV mod-
els. But the volatility of prices for nickel have been a drag on investment in increased mining 
capacity. In consequence, metals analysts warn that “[t] here is no new nickel in the pipeline” 
even as other specialists highlight the time required to fi nd alternatives （Hoyle, 2019）．
 Because options for substituting critical materials appear limited, and perhaps very 
problematic, increased attention to strategic, spatially-smart use of these scarce materials is 
required. The circular economy literature features some new work that attempts to examine 
the spatial issue across countries. This literature seeks to promote circularity （and carbon 
neutrality） within the far-fl ung supply chains that link prominent critical-material producers 
and exporters, such as Australia, to consumer countries within the global resource network. 
This macro-level perspective on circularity and critical materials is important, but surely 
needs to be supplemented with a micro-level focus that starts from cities.
 We have also seen that compact and resource-effi  cient community has long been an 
element of National Spatial Planning and other policy regimes, and is incorporated in Japan’s 
National Resilience and Society 5.0 industrial policies. Japan’s comprehensive approach to cir-
cularity places the objective within multiple other goals, and matches that with integrated in-
stitutions and ample public fi nance. This approach seeks to maximize the co-benefi ts for a 
very broad range of stakeholders, giving the paradigm enduring political legitimacy. The par-
adigm is also the focus of Japanese offi  cial development assistance, which has increased sig-
nifi cantly in the midst of the Covid-19 crisis （IMF, 2020）．In this respect, it is important to 
note that the Overseas Development Institute ranks Japan fi rst in the category of “global co-
operation,” which measures support for multilateral institutions, tackling climate change by 
mitigation and adaptation, and combatting the spread of infectious diseases （ODI, 2019）．
 This paper has argued that Covid-19 has led Japan to accelerate its diff usion of all-
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hazard, disaster-resilient, and silobreaking policy integration. I have outlined the fi scal and 
organizational evidence. Sapporo provides one example of the productive use of the fi scal 
stimulus within Japan’s larger context of 2030-Agenda oriented platform institutions. But 
myriad other examples could just as easily have been adduced to illustrate Japan’s inclusion 
of coping with Covid-19 while building on a larger, pre-existing industrial policy of holistic 
and transformative resilience. In short, the evidence shows that Japan is already emphasizing 
mitigation and adaptation in its countermeasures to Covid-19. Attention to this fact could not 
only help Japan maximize the benefi cial impact of its investment, but also help other coun-
tries learn how to do holistic, silobreaking policymaking and project implementation. Against 
the backdrop of extreme material challenges, Japanese resource-effi  ciency is an important 
model to learn from.
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